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Abstract 
 Does the revelation of covert actions affect a leader’s popularity? The primary purpose of 
this study is to investigate whether such effect exists and, if yes, to determine the extent to which 
it has an influence on the U.S. President’s popularity. This thesis consists of preliminary case 
classification part, from which I proceed to my qualitative studies of the matter. The case 
classification part consists of 16 cases of U.S. covert actions during the Cold War period. I 
classify my cases based on whether they have been exposed or not, as well as I look whether their 
exposure had an effect on the U.S. President’s popularity. If there was an effect, I further 
differentiate them depending on their regime type.  This procedure helped me to select my two 
in-depth case studies. I have conducted two in-depth case studies of U.S. covert actions in Chile 
(1970-73) and Nicaragua (1980s). Throughout the case studies, I have examined the effect of 
exposure on popularity in the following dimensions: media coverage, congressional 
investigations, presidential approval ratings, and election results. Based on the results of case 
studies, it is concluded that the disclosure of covert actions had a less significant effect that lasted 
on a temporary basis and did not have a major impact in a longer perspective. Overall, this study 
advances our understanding of causal mechanisms that shape the effect of covert actions’ 
exposure in influencing a U.S. President’s popularity.   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
The use of covert actions as a foreign policy tool takes its roots from the post-World War II 
period when the increasing Soviet threat in Western Hemisphere pushed Harry S. Truman to 
initiate “the first of a number of covert action programs intended to limit or ‘contain’ Soviet 
advances in Europe and elsewhere in the free world”(Daugherty 2006, 115). This was one of the 
first steps in implementing the action, which over the time would turn into one of the most 
practiced U.S. foreign policy tools during the Cold War period. 
An existing body of literature examines the effect of overt foreign policies on leader’s 
reputation, as well as its further influence on his/her survival in the office (Kernell 1978, Bueno 
de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Smith 1996, Lian and Oneal 1993). Scholarly work on foreign 
policies and its domestic consequences on state leaders, however, tends to neglect the importance 
of covert actions as a foreign policy tool, which can affect a President’s popularity level.  
Leaders use various foreign policy tools in order to save their incumbent positions, which is 
mainly possible by allocating needed goods to their domestic audience (De Mesquita et al, 2003). 
Yet there are certain cases when incumbent President cannot exercise particular types of policies, 
as those might cause the dissatisfaction and disapproval of their domestic supporters. Considering 
these factors, Presidents perform some potentially controversial policy decisions secretly by 
choosing the quiet option of covert actions. However, covert actions also have another side, 
which is the exposure effect. The existing scholarship neglects to address how and when 
exposure happens and how the effect of exposure, if any, may vary.  
In my thesis project, I am interested in analyzing the effect that the revelation of covert 
actions can have on a U.S. President’s popularity. Specifically, my goal is to illustrate the 
potential consequences of an exposed covert action, which, as I argue, has an adverse political 
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effect on a U.S. President’s popularity. In pursuing my goal, I look at the effect of exposure on 
presidential popularity by examining the US history of covert actions’ usage.  
Therefore, the ultimate question that I address in my research is what is the effect of covert 
actions’ exposure on a U.S. President’s popularity? Finding answers to this question would 
benefit the field of knowledge in the following avenues: (1) it sheds light on both the advantages 
and disadvantages of covert actions’ usage as a foreign policy tool, (2) as well as it provides the 
theoretical framework in assessing the covert actions’ exposure effect on the political standing of 
U.S. Presidents. Overall, evaluating all these aspects of covert actions forms the main value and 
contribution of my study. 
 Before starting the examination of covert actions’ various aspects, I am proposing both 
general and more project-oriented definitions of what I mean by using the term “covert actions”. 
As there are various definitions of covert actions (Johnson 1989, 82), I use the following general 
definition of covert actions provided by Kim (2002, 63): “the attempt by a government to 
influence events in another state or territory without revealing its involvement”. However, since I 
am looking at U.S. cases of exposure, I would use the following definition provided in the U.S. 
Congress National Security Act where covert actions are described as: “an activity or activities of 
the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, 
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly” (National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 503E).  
 The rest of the thesis is arranged as follows:  
 Chapter 2 discusses the literature related to the advantages and disadvantages of both overt 
and covert foreign policy tools. It concludes with this study’s main goal and contribution. 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework of the project as well as introduces the hypotheses 
of my study. Chapter 4 describes the research design of the thesis, my case classification process, 
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and the way I conduct my in-depth case studies based on the outlined dimensions of analysis. 
Then, Chapter 5 presents the case study about America’s involvement in Chile and the way it 
might have affected the President Nixon’s popularity. Chapter 6 contains the examination of how 
U.S. covert actions in Nicaragua, which is more known as the Iran-contra case, could have 
influenced President Reagan’s approval rating. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the concluding 
remarks about the whole project and its findings with some further implications for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 
 In order to evaluate the effect that covert action’s exposure can have on presidential 
popularity, it is essential to look at the general factors that have an influence on the incumbent’s 
rating. The President’s performance, hence his/her popularity, is assessed by a number of 
indicators that constitute the overall picture of policy decisions that had been made both on 
domestic and international levels. Since I consider covert actions as a foreign policy tool, 
comparing and contrasting both domestic and foreign policy decisions helps me to identify the 
extent to which the latter one has the effect on the president’s popularity. Furthermore, 
identifying the separate effect of covert action’s exposure, among the other foreign policy 
decisions, is the missing part of the literature that I intend to fill.  
 
What affects the presidential popularity? 
 Mueller (1970) and Stimson (1976) argue that the presidential popularity eventually 
decreases towards the end of incumbent’s term and that the effect of time as an independent 
variable is greater comparing to other variables. Even though Mueller (1970) admits the effect of 
domestic and foreign policy decisions on the presidential popularity, Stimson (1976) argues that 
the incumbent’s popularity might be almost independent from his/her decisions in the office 
(Mueller 1970, 34; Stimson 1976, 18).  
 However, Kernell (1978) argues that the presidential popularity is more affected by real 
events and conditions, not by the time exclusively (Kernell 1978, 521). Kernell (1978) argues 
that the factors like death toll of the US soldiers in Korean and Vietnam wars, economic 
5 
 
 
 
performance, and big scandals like Watergate seem to affect the presidential popularity in short-
term fluctuations (Kernell 1978, 518-520). Thus, let’s examine the importance of both domestic 
and foreign policy decisions and the way it affects the presidential popularity.   
 
The importance of domestic policy decisions 
 
 It is argued that the domestic policy issues are one of the defining factors in shaping the 
public voting behavior. Specifically, it is said that the economic conditions that citizens 
experience tend to affect their voting preferences. Fiorina (1978) supports the idea that economic 
performance of the country affects the voting results, but he could not accomplish to find the 
supporting results in her analysis (Fiorina 1978, 441). However, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) 
argue that economic voting is conditional on the presidential candidate. Meaning, if the 
presidential candidate is running for his/her second term, it is very likely that he/she would be 
evaluated according to the economic conditions; however, in case of a new candidate economic 
voting seems to have a weaker effect (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001, 178).   
 However, Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos (1982), MacKuen (1983), and Marra et al (1990) 
argue that both economy related policies and foreign policy decisions have a significant effect in 
defining the President’s popularity (Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos 1982, 437; MacKuen 1983, 190; 
Marra et al 1990, 619). Therefore, next section examines the literature on how different foreign 
policy decisions affect the President’s popularity. After that, I consider the literature on covert 
actions as a foreign policy tool and the way it might affect the leader’s popularity.  
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Overt foreign policy decisions: advantages and disadvantages 
 Public’s supporting behavior for the President when the country is engaged in international 
crisis is considered as a conventional wisdom. The main advantage of this kind of foreign policy 
decision is that incumbents use international conflicts to increase their popularity by diverting the 
public attention from domestic issues (Miller, 1995). These domestic issues may vary depending 
on a weak economy (DeRouen, 2000) as well as the upcoming end of the term (Smith, 1996). In 
addition, this diversionary behavior differs over the different regime types (Miller 1999, 398-399) 
and perceptions that leaders have about the way they will lose the office (Goemans 2008, 772).  
 However, being bogged in unresolved conflicts or, even worse, losing them might lead to 
negative consequences for the democratic leader’s popularity. Fearon (1994, 586) says that 
democratic countries impose more costs on their incumbents and that those costs “arise because 
citizens care about the international reputation of the country or leader” (Tomz 2007, 821).  Thus, 
democracies at the face of war are more intended to shift additional pool of resources into the 
war, as well as they pick their opponents more cautiously comparing to their autocratic 
counterparts (De Mesquita et al 1999, 803-804). This behavior is mainly motivated by the high 
costs that democratic leaders might suffer in case of the defeat; therefore, democracies try not to 
lose the wars that they are engaged in. Consequently, democracies are less likely to fight other 
democracies. This, in turn, might explain why democracies might employ covert actions against 
other established or “new” democracies. 
   With regard to the costs of foreign policy decisions, Mueller (2005) and Gartner (2008) 
argue that the increasing cost of war (measured by the fatality level) negatively affects the 
leader’s popularity. Thus, low-cost wars tend to have a less negative effect on the presidential 
approval. In this sense, it is important to look if such tendencies would be consistent with the 
usage and exposure of covert actions.  
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Covert actions as a foreign policy choice 
 As opposed to public policies, democratic leaders apply covert actions in order to decrease 
or even eliminate the potential audience costs (e.g. losing office, votes, seats in congress), which 
is useful in saving the reputation of the country in the international arena. In addition to that, 
democratic leaders might want to avoid being involved in or escalating the international conflict 
that might attract the high attention of his/her domestic audience, therefore, it would be more 
reasonable to use covert policy tools to influence the international issues that are at stake.  
 Johnson (1989) in his detailed research on the U.S. covert actions’ accountability shows 
that public opinion about covert actions varies depending on the presence of any “contrived 
threats from abroad” (i.e. fear of communism); and, contrary to that, if there is no major threat or 
the presence of “a scandal involving the intelligence agencies” this might lead to a tighter control, 
as well as to higher costs of using covert actions (Johnson 1989, 103-104).  
 It is well known that democracies “do not use overt force against each other” (Forsythe 
1992, 385). However, could they apply covert actions against each other? Forsythe (1992) 
analyzed the importance of target state’s regime type for an initiator (U.S.) and concluded that the 
U.S. considered its target states as immature democracies; thus, the use of covert actions against 
these states is not conflicting with the democratic peace argument (Forsythe 1992, 393).  
 Similarly, Downes and Lilley (2010) used both democratic peace and selectorate theory 
assumptions in order to examine the logic behind choosing covert actions as a foreign policy tool 
against democratically elected governments. Their findings seem to challenge the democratic 
peace assumptions. On the example of Chile, authors show that the U.S. officials were informed 
about the fact that “Chile was bound for military dictatorship and that democratic governance 
would not return any time soon” (Downes and Lilley 2010, 303).  This, as authors claim, 
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contradicts the norms argument of democratic peace, which as Reiter and Stam (2002) put it 
“…democracies would not use any means, overt or covert, to subvert or overthrow another 
democratically elected government, as such action would clearly be a violation of democratic 
norms” (Reiter and Stam 2002, 160 cited in Downes and Lilley 2010, 268).  
 Rosato (2003) explains why advanced democracies like the U.S. might use covert actions 
against other democratically elected governments. One potential explanation is that states often 
have varying perceptions about democracy and because of that, they might purposely demonize 
the image of the enemy (Rosato 2003, 593). This tells us how leaders, despite the democratic 
prospects in the target state, could change or influence the perception of the public so to make the 
target state look more evil in order to lower the effect of exposure on the leader. 
Leaders care about the success of foreign policy decisions and it is in their interests not to 
go public in giving any statements or promises related to their actions on the international arena 
(Tomz 2007, 836). Thus, it is better to perform risky foreign policy decisions covertly rather than 
overtly. In this way, using covert actions as a foreign policy tool can be beneficial in terms of 
eliminating the risks of generating high audience costs, as well as an additional source of 
providing public goods in terms of security (e.g. preventing the spread of communist threat), 
which in turn positively influences the leader’s political standing.  
However, some pitfalls might appear while using covert actions. The biggest of which is 
the danger of being exposed. The existing scholarly literature has not yet addressed the effect that 
covert action’s exposure can have on the leader’s popularity. Addressing the covert action’s 
exposure effect might give us answers to a question of why leaders don’t use them all the time as 
opposed to overt policies. Therefore, the effect of exposure on presidential popularity begs the 
theoretical explanation, from which it would be better evaluated. Thus, taking an attempt to fill 
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this gap in the scholarly research would be the ultimate goal and contribution of my thesis 
project.  
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Chapter 3  Theoretical Framework 
 
 I examine the U.S. cases of covert action’s exposure and its possible effect on the U.S. 
incumbent President’s popularity. The United States has a rich history of using covert actions as a 
foreign policy tool. There is also as well as there is a lot of literature and declassified documents 
available that details the U.S. covert actions. This makes it a good starting point in addressing the 
covert actions and the overall effect of exposure. In exploring US covert actions, I avoid making 
assumptions regarding the nature of exposure and its effect on the leaders of other countries and 
regimes.  
 In evaluating the effect of covert action’s exposure, it is very crucial to be careful with the 
temporal factor. Meaning, in order to identify whether there was any effect on popularity, we 
need to know when and how the covert action was exposed. Thus, I consider only those covert 
actions that were exposed during the presidency of an initiator or his/her successor. The covert 
actions that have been exposed after the initiating incumbent’s term have no effect on the 
popularity due to its irrelevance. However, if the covert action was exposed during the next 
president’s term and if both the successor and initiator are members of the same party, then the 
revelation of a covert action can create a backlash effect that might affect the popularity of a 
successor. That said, let us now look at the conditions when and why a U.S. President might use 
covert actions as opposed to overt actions.  
  
Why does a U.S. President use covert actions? 
 My unit of analysis is the U.S. President, more specifically his/her popularity rate when a 
covert action is exposed. A President is the main decision making actor and his/her main desire is 
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to remain in office and keep the popularity at an appropriate level, so the opponents or 
constituents would not make him/her leave the office before the end of the term. In order to 
preserve his/her popularity, a U.S. President, as any ruler in the world, needs to satisfy the 
domestic audience, specifically those who have a say in defining his/her political standing 
(winning coalition (W) and selectorate (S)) with a proper amount of public and private goods. 
The amount of private and public goods’ allocation depends on the size of both S and W (De 
Mesquita et al 2003, 81-82).  
 A President may implement various policies both at the domestic and foreign level in order 
to provide the backers with the goods that they need. Almost every policy decision has a risk of 
harming a President’s reputation and popularity in case of its unsuccessful outcome. We know 
that leaders care about their reputation and thus tend to calculate the risks of policy decisions in 
order to protect themselves from the possibility of a negative fallout (Tomz 2007, 832). Taking 
this into account, I consider a President’s usage of covert actions as a foreign policy tool that s/he 
implements in order to provide his/her W and S with needed public and private goods.  
 However, before selecting the covert action option, a President faces a situation where s/he 
needs to make a decision of which foreign policy option – overt or covert – it is better to choose. 
Such decision-making procedure considers all the possible benefits and risks that might affect the 
overall utility of an option. 
 I assume that the use of covert action is important to the leader only at times when the cost 
of overt action is too high and, thus, the leader decides to use covert action since its cost is lower.  
However, if, in case of exposure, the public finds out that the cost of covert action was high (big 
reputational costs, high controversy, and/or high number of casualties), it is more likely that the 
punishment would be harsher comparing to the low-cost covert action’s exposure. This 
assumption comes from the findings of Mueller (2005) and Gartner (2008) where they argue that 
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there is a negative relationship between high death toll rates and a leader’s popularity. Following 
this logic, the effect of covert action’s exposure might differ depending on its costs and hence 
affect the degree to which the public might punish the leader.  
 Overall, we can see that a leader chooses policy options regarding their overall expected 
utility and if the utility is positive and the benefits outweigh the costs, the incumbent tends to 
choose the most beneficial alternative. That said, I now focus on the consequences that the covert 
action’s exposure might have on the leader once it has been chosen and implemented. 
   
Benefits/advantages of covert action 
 The use of covert actions helps to deliver such public goods as national security, as well 
as private goods in the form of protecting the business interests of domestic companies located 
overseas. These actions include, but are not limited to, states covertly influencing the political 
situation in the target states in order to prevent the spread of unwanted ideologies or the 
implementation of undesirable reforms (Johnson 1989, 84-85). In addition, in order to protect the 
business interests, covert actions might be applied to influence the foreign country’s domestic 
reforms on nationalizing the natural resources and/or putting restrictions on repatriation of profits 
by foreign corporations (Downes and Lilley 2010, 283).  
 In addition, one of the main advantages of covert actions is its secret nature. The reason for 
the secrecy is that most of the foreign policy tools in covert actions’ arsenal are quite 
controversial and may give rise to public disagreement (Berkowitz and Goodman 1998, 38). That 
said, covert actions are used in situations where overt interventions are not acceptable or might 
harm a leader’s political reputation both at the domestic and international level. In this regard, 
covert actions help to achieve political objectives without risking public disapproval. This 
specific trait of a covert action makes it more preferable in comparison to an overt decision, the 
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exercise of which is always visible and traceable. However, this is mainly related to the policy 
decisions that might be seen as controversial or even unacceptable by a democratic public. Thus, 
policy decisions that a democratic public considers as appropriate by its nature are better to be 
performed overtly.  
 
Risks/disadvantages of covert action 
 There is always a risk of exposure, which might have its negative effect on the popularity 
level of the incumbent. The disclosure of covert actions can have the consequences of losing 
popularity or credibility. It might also lead to changes in a leader’s accountability. A leader also 
might face consequences on the international level where other states might express their distrust 
to the actions of the state exercising covert actions. Domestic costs also can include 
Congressional hearings that might be initiated as a result of the covert action’s exposure. This, in 
turn, might lead to major consequences like losing the majority of seats in upcoming elections or 
even presidential impeachment. With regard to Congressional elections, a President’s opponents 
can use this opportunity to publicize the event and try to make it look controversial to the core 
values of their society. Thus, I assume that U.S. Presidents are vulnerable to their opponents’ 
actions in publicizing exposed covert actions, which is due to the openness of the society. Faring 
poorly in mid-term elections can also potentially has a negative effect on a democratic leader in 
an upcoming presidential election in terms of decreasing the chances to be elected for a second 
term. In addition, this kind of consequences have a chance to affect the overall popularity of a 
leader’s own party by making it hard to win elections in the future.  
 In addition, due to the system of norms and civic mindedness of the society that s/he leads, 
the U.S. President is constrained by norms of civic conduct. Thus, the U.S. Presidents are 
expected to be more careful in exercising potentially controversial foreign policies (regime 
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overthrow, covert arms supply, paramilitary operations, bribing officials, etc.). These restraints 
affect the president’s calculus before using covert actions as a foreign policy tool. Yet when a 
covert action is initiated, a President is expected to do his/her best in order to eliminate the 
possibility of any negative consequences of exposure. This kind of precautions are supposed to 
secure the incumbent from popularity losses in case of exposure. 
  
The danger of exposure 
In evaluating the effect of exposure on a presidential popularity, it is important to define 
how the public reacts to such cases of exposure and how their perceptions can affect their voting 
behavior, which, in turn, might punish the president as a result of unsuccessful foreign policy 
decisions. The literature on public opinion has varying claims about how a public perceives 
politics and foreign policy issues. Some claim that the public blindly follows the guidance of the 
leader (Lipset 1966, Verba et al 1967), others argue that the public typically does not know much 
about political issues (Delli-Carpini & Keeter 1996, Holsti 2004 cited in Baum and Potter 2008, 
43). However, I incorporate the assumption made by Aldrich et al (2006) that citizens can form 
their views about foreign policy issues, as well as evaluate them so that it affects their voting 
behavior. Thus, since the perception of the public about foreign policy issues influences their 
voting preferences, leaders tend to care about the electoral consequences of their foreign policy 
decisions. In addition, I assume that citizens care about the reputation of their country. Therefore, 
they care about those foreign policy issues that might affect the reputation of the country, as well 
as about those that could violate the norms of their democratic values (Tomz, 2007). These 
reasons constitute the foundation of citizens’ desire to punish a President for exposed covert 
actions, which are contrary to their core democratic values and have a negative impact on the 
reputation of their country. Following this assumption, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H1: Exposed covert actions are expected to have a negative effect on a U.S. President’s 
popularity. 
Regarding the issue of whom to blame and punish, I argue that the U.S. President by being 
a primary decision maker of United States’ foreign diplomacy, as well as by being a commander-
in-chief of the American forces, is held responsible for all executed covert actions. Even though 
there might be some cases when the U.S. President could try to deny his/her relationship and 
awareness of committed covert actions, I assume that such actions should still lead to a decrease 
in his/her popularity since the public relates most of the policy failures to the President directly. 
However, plausible deniability is possible if there is an indisputable evidence of an incumbent’s 
innocence and direct testimony of someone admitting the blame for covert actions. Therefore, a 
U.S. President takes full responsibility as the chief executive. 
However, the effect of covert actions’ exposure might be different if there is a visible 
difference between the regime types of initiator and target states. This comes from an intuition 
that civic mindedness and the values of democratic norms in the society, influences the public’s 
perception about other states abroad. As Rosato (2003) says: “…nondemocracies are neither 
trusted nor respected” mainly because “their domestic systems are considered unjust” (Rosato 
2003, 586). Thus, I assume that democratic states are well trusted and respected by other 
democracies, which leads to my assumption that the overall reaction of the U.S. public to a 
controversial foreign policy decision (e.g. paramilitary operations, regime overthrow, etc.) is 
going to be more negative if the target country is a democratic one. Therefore, I propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H2: The negative effect of an exposed covert action on a U.S. President’s popularity is 
expected to be greater if the target state is a democracy. 
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I test my hypotheses by categorizing the cases of U.S. covert actions conducted during the 
period from 1949 to 1990. By analyzing their exposure (if any) and evaluating the possible 
effects, I seek to test whether my hypotheses have any support among my cases. Then, I conduct 
two in-depth case studies of exposed U.S. covert actions against democratic and non-democratic 
states in order to see whether the effect of exposure differs depending on the target state’s regime 
type. Evaluating these hypotheses should give us new insights into how the exposure of covert 
actions might affect a U.S. President’s popularity, which is the primary goal of my thesis project.  
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Chapter 4 Research Design 
 
Case Classification 
The absence of any large-N data on the U.S. covert actions makes it hard to conduct any 
statistical research on this matter. Thus, due to the data limitations and small sample size, I 
classify my cases according to whether they have been exposed or not, regime type, and the 
effect on presidential popularity. 
In order to test my hypotheses, I consider 16 cases of U.S. covert actions (see Appendix 1 
for the full list of cases) towards other states (Berger et al, 2013). The reason for choosing the 
U.S. as the country of my analysis is the fact that I am interested in the effect of covert actions’ 
exposure on democratic leaders. Being one of the oldest and most developed democracies of the 
world as well as its long history of practicing covert actions as a foreign policy tool makes the 
U.S. a perfect match for this study. 
I look at the covert actions that have been initiated by the United States during the period of 
1949-1990. This particular time framework is chosen because most of the U.S. covert actions that 
we know about have been performed during the Cold War period. Thus, more information and 
declassified documents related to the operations are accessible to the public, which benefits the 
project in terms of collecting information. 
To address my first hypothesis, I first look at the date of exposure and the way it might 
have affected the initiator leader. If the covert action was exposed after the initiator president’s 
term, I have eliminated it from the list of cases. After classifying the cases according to this 
criterion, out of the initial 16, I had 13 cases left that were exposed while the initiator leader was 
in office. In order to evaluate the time of exposure, I refer to the New York Times articles that 
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reveal the U.S. covert actions against another state. In doing so, I look at the date of news’ 
publication and see whether it was followed by a drop in presidential approval ratings thereafter. 
The New York Times articles are accessed through the online subscription to its archive. I do not 
know for sure whether the New York Times articles were the first to reveal the use of covert 
actions, however, since it is the biggest U.S. newspaper with a high circulation rate, I consider it 
as a relevant source of exposure.  
If the exposed covert action was led by at least a 5% drop in presidential approval ratings, 
then I consider such case as one that had an effect on the incumbent leader’s popularity. Those 
covert action exposures that were followed by a lesser decrease in presidential approval are 
considered to have an insignificant effect. I use the data from “The American Presidency Project” 
website (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016) to look at the changes in presidential approval ratings.    
The difference or similarity between the initiator and target state’s regime type, as I 
assume, should have an influence on the effect of covert action’s exposure. Thus, in order to 
evaluate my second hypothesis, I classify my cases according to regime type as democratic or 
non-democratic, then see whether the exposure of covert actions against the democratic states 
was followed by a drop in popularity and look whether the drop is more significant in comparison 
to non-democratic states. To identify the regime type of target states, I use the polity2 variable 
taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). In order to be classified as a 
democratic state, the target state’s polity2 score should be equal or higher than 6.0 points. 
However, if the score is less than 6.0 points, the target state is considered as a non-democracy. 
Classifying my cases in this manner helps me to get the overall picture of U.S. covert 
actions and to see whether it had an effect on presidential popularity or not. It also helps me to 
select the cases for my in-depth case study analysis. My next section discusses the outcome of 
my case classification process.  
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Case Classification Results 
 After conducting the classification process, I discarded three cases that have been exposed 
after the initiator president’s term, which are Congo, Iraq, and Poland. Thus, I am left with 
overall 13 cases of U.S. covert action exposure (see Table 1). The table above gives an overview 
of my cases with the list of initiator presidents and the dates of covert action’s initiation and 
exposure, as well as it shows the polity2 scores before and after each covert action. The time of 
exposure is evaluated from the dates when the New York Times’ revealing articles had been 
published. Since some of the covert actions caused the regime change, I consider the polity2 
score before the year covert action was initiated in order to indicate the regime type of the target 
state. In addition, I provide the polity2 score of the year after the covert action in order to 
illustrate whether there were any changes in the target state's regime type. After evaluating the 
collected data, I divide my cases according to the fact of exposure and the effect it had on the 
presidential approval rating (see Table 2). As a result, I have separated eight cases out of thirteen 
that were exposed and followed by a decrease in presidential popularity. This, in turn, supports 
my first hypothesis, which states that the covert action’s exposure should have a negative effect 
on a U.S. President.  
Table 2. Exposed/Unexposed U.S. Covert Actions 
   Exposure No Exposure 
Effect on Popularity Afghanistan, Angola, Chile, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, Turkey. 0 
 Overall: 8  
No Effect Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Vietnam. Iraq, Congo, Poland.  
  Overall: 5 Overall: 3 
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 Among these 13 cases of exposed covert actions, I now look whether the exposure of 
covert actions against the democratic target states had an effect on a presidential popularity. 
There are only three democratic target states among my cases and all of them were followed by a 
decrease in presidential approval ratings (see Table 1 and Table 3). Moreover, all three cases led 
to more than 5% fall in presidential popularity. On the other hand, I have an even split among the 
non-democratic states, five of which had an effect when the other five did not have any effect on 
popularity ratings.  
 Classifying my cases into tables was beneficial in terms of selecting my in-depth case 
studies. I choose one case of US covert action against a non-democratic state, which is Nicaragua 
and the other one against a democratic state, which is Chile. Both of the cases had been exposed 
and were followed by a drop in presidential approval ratings. Next section gives a more detailed 
justification for these case study selections.  
Table 3. Democratic/Non-democratic Target States 
   Democratic Non-democratic 
Effect on 
Popularity 
Chile, Syria, Turkey. Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua. 
Overall: 3 Overall: 5 
No Effect 
0 Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Vietnam. 
  Overall: 5 
 
Case Studies 
One of the limitations of my preliminary analysis is the absence of any large-N data related 
to the covert actions, which makes it difficult to derive any statistically strong results. To deal 
with this issue and with the goal of properly addressing my research question, through focusing 
on the in-depth analysis of causal mechanisms of covert action’s exposure that affects the U.S. 
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President’s popularity, I have decided to apply a case study method, which is essential in deriving 
conclusions that could be used on a larger set of units. 
I conduct two in-depth case studies of U.S. covert actions against one democratic and non-
democratic states: Chile 1970-73 and Nicaragua 1980s (Winn 2005, 140). The fact that both of 
these countries have differing regime types gives us an opportunity to examine whether there 
would be a varying effect of exposure on the presidential popularity. I am also picking up these 
cases because of the fact that they are chronologically separated by the Church Committee’s 
investigation, which happened in 1975. 
The Church Committee changed the basis of the C.I.A.’s and other executive officials’ 
accountability in conducting covert actions. (Johnson 1989, 90). As well as the Intelligence 
Accountability Act, passed in 1980, is believed to be the most “important formal measure taken 
by the Congress to tighten its control over intelligence operations” (Johnson 1989, 92). Thus, 
selecting these particular cases gives an opportunity to examine the presence of compliance, if 
any, from the side of the U.S. intelligence services as well as executive branch officials. A tighter 
control over covert actions increases the consequences of misbehavior, which, consequently, 
affects the President’s actions in preventing the exposure. 
In order to trace the causal mechanisms of each case’s exposure effect, I examine my case 
studies in the following dimensions: (i) background of the covert actions, (ii) executed covert 
actions, (iii) exposure and its effect on the popularity of the President. Specifically, I focus on the 
exposure and its effect, as it constitutes the main interest to me. The effect of exposure on a U.S. 
President's popularity is examined through: (1) the extent to which the exposure was covered in 
the media, (2) the impact of congressional investigations, (3) presidential approval ratings 
evaluated through public opinion polls, and (4) election results subsequent to covert action’s 
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exposure. By identifying the causal mechanisms of each case, I will be able to find some valuable 
insights that shed light on the effect of the exposure and the way it affects a U.S. President. 
While examining my case studies, I analyze primary sources consisting of declassified 
C.I.A. documents posted on the George Washington University’s National Security Archive 
website, secondary sources like scholarly and newspaper articles, various books, as well as 
the New York Times newspaper articles. Particularly, analyzing the newspaper articles is helpful 
in terms of evaluating the media coverage and the way the issue was publicized among the 
public.  
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Chapter 5  U.S. Covert Action in Chile, 1970-1973 
 
Introduction 
 The Cold War period of the American history is rich with its various interventions to the 
affairs of foreign states all around the world. The overwhelming majority of those states were 
nondemocracies with the regimes that have been either inconvenient for U.S. businesses or 
geopolitical interests. In most of the cases, these interests used to intervene with each other. 
However, it is rare to find a state that had a democratically elected government, but still was 
perceived as a threat to the U.S. economic or political interests. In this sense, the U.S. 
intervention in Chile throughout 1960-1970s remains as one of the starkest examples of its kind. 
As Goldberg (1975) mentions, Chile could be considered as a country with one of the most 
developed civic institutions in the Third World at the time (Goldberg 1975, 94). Despite this fact, 
the Chilean government was considered as a threat to U.S. business and geopolitical interests.  
 Although the background and events of the U.S. involvement in Chile are well studied and 
analyzed, however, the existing scholarship remains silent on the way it affected the popularity of 
the U.S. president at that time. Thus, in my attempt to fill this gap, I use this case study to test my 
hypotheses in terms of investigating how the exposure of covert action affected the popularity of 
the American leader. Thus, this case study is intended to answer the following question: what 
effect did the exposure of the U.S. involvement in Chile have on the popularity of the American 
president? 
 The case study proceeds as follows: after analyzing the debate whether the U.S. was 
involved in Allende’s overthrow or not, the case of Chile is examined in the following three 
dimensions: (i) background of the covert intervention, (ii) variety of implemented covert actions, 
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(iii) and the central focus of the paper is on the exposure and its effect on the popularity of a U.S. 
President.  
 
Background of a Covert Action 
 For many years, Latin America was considered as a “backyard” to U.S. foreign policy 
interests. The U.S. Government treated this sphere of influence very jealously and always tried to 
make its interests secure in this area. The history of U.S. involvement in Chile goes back to the 
1960s, when both Kennedy and Johnson supported the candidacy of Frei in the Chilean 
presidential race (Winn 2005, 139; Qureshi 2006, 40). The main reason for this support was 
preventing Frei’s main counterpart – Salvador Allende – from becoming president, whose victory 
would lead to the nationalization of the Chilean economy (Qureshi 2006, 40). Consequently, this 
put in danger business revenues of such U.S. companies like the International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (ITT), Pepsico, Kennecott, and the Anaconda Company, which had been 
one of the major players in Chilean economy (Sigmund 1974, 323; Brosche 1974, 12).  
 The fear of the U.S. companies have grown stronger when Allende rallied for a new 
election in the 1970s. These fears also added to the U.S. officials’ concern about Allende’s 
Marxist-socialist platform, as well as his connections with Cuba and the USSR (Fagen 1975, 298; 
Qureshi 2006, 44). At this time U.S. involvement in preventing Allende from being elected was 
obvious, however, covert participation in organizing and/or assisting the 1973 coup remains a 
subject of scholarly debate. 
   
Did the U.S. have any role in the 1973 coup? 
 In his review of Gustafson’s (2007) book, Shiraz (2011) highlights the disputable claims of 
the author that denies the participation of the CIA in the 1973 military coup (Shiraz 2011, 606). 
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Shiraz mentions the author’s assertions that “the CIA had reduced its contacts with the military 
plotters and was instead expanding the preexisting links within the increasingly marginalized 
Christian Democratic Party” (Shiraz 2011, 606). More controversially, in his (2005) article, 
Gustafson claims that “not only did the U.S. not help in the Chilean coup, but they also barely 
knew it was coming” (Gustafson 2005, 77). This, obviously, doesn’t meet the reality of the 
situation where the US had a major intelligence presence. 
 Sigmund (1974), relying on the results of the McGee committee investigations, rejects any 
assumptions about a U.S. covert intervention in Chile (Sigmund 1974, 321). However, he admits 
that U.S. business owners were concerned over the fact that the election of Allende would have a 
negative effect on their businesses in Chile, which it subsequently did (Sigmund 1974, 323). 
Overall, the CIA, as a former CIA officer in Santiago describes it, was not involved in the 
military coup of 1973, though he admits the fact that the CIA helped to initiate the unsuccessful 
coup attempt of October 1970, in which the commander in chief of the Chilean army – General 
Schneider – was killed (Devine 2014, 26-28).     
 However, there are scholars that argue that U.S. involvement in the 1970 elections to 
prevent Allende from taking the presidential office have played its crucial role in setting the 
scene for the coup of 1973 (Johnson 1989, Forsythe 1992, Kornbluh 1999). As such, Forsythe 
(1992) mentions the attempts of the U.S. Government to “bribe the Chilean Congress to block 
Allende’s election, to fund truckers in their disruptive strikes” (Forsythe 1992, 389). Kornbluh 
(1999) shares other interesting insights related to the 1970 elections, where the U.S. Ambassador 
to Chile – Edward Korry – tried to persuade former President Frei to annul the results of the 
elections. In doing so, he encouraged him to run for re-election, in which the CIA was ready to 
mobilize a propaganda campaign to support his candidacy (Kornbluh 1999, 38).  
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  All these claims are also supported by a declassified CIA report, which talks about the 
establishment of a Chilean Task Force, “headed by highly-qualified CIA officers recalled from 
their posts” to prevent the Marxist Allende from becoming the Chilean president (Kornbluh 2011, 
2-3). 
 After evaluating both sides of the argument, we see that the U.S. had not have executed the 
1973 Chilean coup. It was the Chilean senior military officers who have plotted the coup. The 
reason for that was the fear to lose their possession of power in the Chilean society, which was 
threatened by younger officers’ intentions to plot a coup. Thus, in order to save their positions, 
they decided to initiate a coup ahead of young officers (Devine 2014, 32). Nevertheless, the U.S. 
had been involved in different covert actions prior and during the 1970 Presidential elections in 
Chile, which “had helped to create a climate for the coup without tainting the effort by becoming 
directly involved” (Devine 2014, 33). That said, let us take a closer look at U.S. covert actions in 
Chile and the way their disclosure affected the popularity of an American leader.  
 
Executed Covert Actions 
  The case of Chile is prominent in a sense that it is rich with various covert action tools. 
Those tools vary from basic propaganda campaigns to economic and paramilitary operations 
devoted to influencing the Chilean citizens as well as influential policymakers. Overall, from 
1964 to 1970, the CIA has spent about “$2 million on 12 covert action projects in Chile” (U.S. 
Congress. Senate 1975a,12). In this section, I briefly analyze the various covert actions that were 
used to distance Allende from the presidential office. 
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Political and economic actions:  
 In 1965, The 303 Committee approved $175,000 towards supporting the CIA selected 
candidates in congressional campaigns against the Socialist-Marxist party of Allende and another 
project that “helped train and organize anti-Communists among peasants and slum dwellers” 
(U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 12).  
 There is also a declassified CIA report (Kornbluh 2011), which gives an assessment of the 
situation in Chile prior to Allende’s victory in 1970 elections. The report considers various action 
initiatives that could have been applied to prevent Allende from taking the office (Kornbluh 
2011, 11-16). One of them is a “political action” that was intended “to induce President Frei to 
prevent Allende’s election by Congress”, meaning, to make Frei influence the members of the 
Chilean Congress to oppose Allende (Kornbluh 2011, 11).  
 All these political covert actions were also accompanied by the policies that have been 
implemented in order to destabilize the Chilean economy. In June of 1971, the Chilean Congress 
passed a bill that unanimously approved the nationalization of the American-owned copper mines 
(Goldberg 1975, 108). As a counter response, the U.S. government announced its opposition to 
multilateral loans; U.S. commercial banks decreased the amount of short-term credits to Chile, 
and the amount of U.S. exports to Chile dropped more than half (Brosche 1974, 12; Goldberg 
1975, 108-109).  
  
Propaganda campaign 
 In order to support the Christian Democratic Party and specifically Frei’s presidential 
candidacy in the 1964 elections, the CIA applied a wide array of propaganda tools as radio 
broadcasts, posters, and news in the press, which were aimed to discourage the local population 
from casting the Marxist ballot (Qureshi 2006, 61). This campaign was addressed to scare people, 
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mainly women, by creating an evil communist image of Allende among the citizenry (U.S. 
Congress. Senate 1975a,11). 
 U.S. officials’ tactics for the 1970 elections were different from the previous campaign. For 
this time, the 303 Committee decided to focus only on spoiling and anti-Allende propaganda, 
rather than supporting any particular candidates or parties (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 12). 
However, the 1970 campaign was not as successful as the previous 1964 operation with regard to 
affecting the citizens’ voting preferences (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 13).   
 
Military actions 
 The U.S. efforts to assist in coup in Chile go back to the 1970s pre-election era, at the time 
when U.S. officials (especially Kissinger) started to worry about the possibility of Allende 
winning the presidential office. Those worries are explicitly stated in Kissinger’s (November 5, 
1970) memorandum for President Nixon, where he outlines the issue and the possible ways to 
deal with it (Kornbluh 2013, 3-6). One of the major examples of U.S. military involvement is that 
it assisted local militaries in kidnapping the Commander in Chief of the Chilean army – General 
Schneider (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 14; Winn 2005, 143). In addition, U.S. officials helped 
Pinochet to take power and eventually “viewed General Augusto Pinochet as a potential leader” 
(Qureshi 2006, 150). As a consequence of these actions, the democratically elected President 
Allende was overthrown in a military coup in September 1973. The political scene of Chile had 
been dominated by a junta, which was led by a notorious General Pinochet. This, as we now 
know, resulted in one of the bloodiest episodes in Chilean history.  
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Exposure and the popularity of the President 
 This section examines the effect that the exposure of the U.S. involvement had on the 
American President’s popularity. In order to investigate the effect of exposure on the U.S. 
President, this section focuses on the following dimensions: (i) media coverage of U.S. 
involvement in Chile, (ii) subsequent Congressional investigations regarding the covert actions in 
Chile, (iii) evaluation of public opinion polls, (iv) and the results of both presidential and mid-
term elections. Evaluating all these dimensions help to assess the reputational and political 
damage (if any) that the exposure of covert actions might have had on President Nixon.  
 
Media coverage 
The possibility of U.S. involvement in Chile started to be questioned in the media starting 
in March 1972. It all started from Jack Anderson’s revelation of the I.T.T.’s secret documents and 
memorandums that indicated the cooperation between the I.T.T., Nixon administration, and the 
C.I.A. in preventing Salvador Allende from winning the presidential elections (New York Times, 
1972a). The papers mentioned in Anderson’s column “were said to have been exchanged among 
I.T.T. officials between the time of election on Sept. 4, 1970 and Dr. Allende’s inauguration in 
November” (New York Times, 1972b). However, both I.T.T. and Nixon administration rejected 
any moves between the parties “to block Dr. Allende from the Chilean Presidency” (New York 
Times, 1972b; Szulc, 1972).  
Consequently, the New York Times reported that in order to check these assertions, the U.S. 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided to launch an inquiry of the I.T.T and other U.S. 
companies’ influence on America’s foreign policy, especially, the I.T.T.’s attempts in persuading 
the U.S. Government to oust Salvador Allende from the Chilean presidential race (Finney, 1972). 
Despite of news publications and the Senate inquiries, American public seemed to be silent and 
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there was no drop in Nixon’s popularity. President Nixon’s approval ratings did not change at all 
during the March-April period of 1972. In fact, it increased from 53% in April to 61% in May 
1972 (see Figure 1 below, Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). This potentially could be explained 
by the absence of any direct connections to Nixon and/or by the fact that no one admitted the 
allegations proposed by Anderson.     
The investigation reported by the New York Times started in March of 1973. The Senate 
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations have met with the I.T.T. officers on March 16 1973 
and gave their testimonies regarding the company’s relationship with the U.S. Government in 
plotting against Salvador Allende (Naughton, 1973). A former I.T.T.’s vice president, William 
Merriam, who was a head of the company’s Washington office, testified that a top ranking C.I.A. 
officer “agreed with the recommendation that corporation made to try to prevent the election of 
Salvador Allende…” (Shanahan, 1973a). The mentioned C.I.A. official was William Broe who 
was the director of the agency’s clandestine activities in Latin America.   
In addition, the New York Times announced that other I.T.T. officials testified about a $1-
million offer to the C.I.A., a purpose of which, however, raised a concern due to the discrepancy 
in company officials’ testimony (Shanahan, 1973b). The I.T.T. director, John McCone, testified 
that at the very beginning the sum was offered for “constructive purposes, such as low-cost 
housing”, however, after it was known that the Chilean Congress would vote to choose the 
president of 1970 election, the money was decided “to finance anti-Allende coalition in the 
Chilean Congress” (Shanahan, 1973b). Contrary to that, Edward Gerrity – the I.T.T. senior vice 
president for corporate relations – insisted that the money was intended to be used only in 
“constructive” purposes. However, as subcommittee sources said, Broe’s testimony indicated that 
the $1-million sum was planned to apply “covert means to prevent the election of Dr. Allende” 
(Shanahan, 1973b).  
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Date 
Nixon's Approval Rating 
The disclosure of news that reported the direct relationship between the I.T.T. and C.I.A. 
were followed by a 10% drop in presidential approval ratings during the March-April period of 
1973. The presidential approval rating went down from 57% in March 27, to 47% in April 24 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Presidential Job Approval Rating of Richard Nixon, 1969-1974. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “The American Presidency Project” Website (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016) 
  
 Another wave of exposures in the media occurred in September of 1974 at the very 
beginning of newly nominated President Ford’s term. The New York Times reported that the 
C.I.A. director, William Colby, in his April 1974 testimony to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
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Committee, has stated that more than $8-million were authorized by President Nixon for covert 
actions in Chile during the period of 1970-1973 to displace Allende from power (Hersh 1974a, 
1). Moreover, Mr. Colby testified that $5-million “was authorized by the 40 Committee for more 
‘destabilization’ efforts in 1971, 1972 and 1973” right after Allende’s election in 1970 (Hersh 
1974a, 26). This, in turn, highlights the direct involvement of Nixon’s National Security Advisor 
Dr. Kissinger who was the chair of the 40 Committee. As a result of this disclosure, the New York 
Times reported that Representative Michael Harrington urged the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee to initiate a “full-scale public hearings into the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
clandestine operations against the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile” 
(Hersh, 1974b).  
 Consequently, on September 17 the New York Times reported, relying on highly reliable 
Congressional sources, that the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee “has recommended 
that contempt of Congress charges be placed against Richard Helmes, former director of Central 
Intelligence, and three retired Nixon Administration officials” (Hersh, 1974c). The main reason 
for the charges to be placed is the concern that the officials might have “committed perjury in 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in the spring of 1973” (Hersh, 
1974c).  
 Despite the large scale and media coverage, all these revelations happened right after 
President Ford pardoning President Nixon subsequent of his resignation, which, as the New York 
Times report shows, cost him 21% drop in popularity (New York Times, 1974). These results are 
pretty much the same with the ones presented on the Figure 2, which shows that President Ford’s 
popularity went down starting from 70% in August to 49% by the end of September of 1974 
(Figure 2, Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). In addition to that, a special poll “taken for the New 
York Times immediately after the pardon” indicated that 62% of people disapproved the decision 
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(New York Times 1974). Thus, it makes it difficult to link the approval drop with the news related 
to the U.S. involvement in Chile.  
Overall, during the period of January 1, 1972-December 31, 1976 there were 255 articles 
published in the New York Times newspaper related to the C.I.A. and Chile. Compare that with 
7298 articles that had been published in the same newspaper during the period of June 1, 1972 
and December 31, 1976, which were related to the Watergate affair. The Watergate news record 
clearly exceeds that of Chile. Therefore, since the mass media attention of that year was primarily 
focused on the Watergate scandal, it is hard to differentiate the effect of the news related to the 
Chilean covert actions. In this regard, it could be more helpful to look at the congressional 
investigations, opinion polls, as well as the election results in order to see if there was any effect 
at all.  
 
Congressional investigations 
 After the publication of revealing articles in September 1974, the New York Times reported 
that the U.S. Senate had authorized the investigation of the U.S. intelligence services. The 
authorized committee was named after its chairman Senator Frank Church (Rosenbaum 1975). 
 The investigation results brought up many insights into U.S. covert actions in Chile during 
the period of 1963-1973. As Chairman Church mentioned in his opening statement “the nature 
and extent of the American role in the overthrow of a democratically-elected Chilean 
Government are matters for deep and continuing public concern” (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 
1). According to this statement, we can see that the Church Committee viewed the Chilean 
Government (i.e. Allende) as democratically elected and the fact of covert actions being executed 
towards such state raises the public concern in the American society. The Church Committee 
investigations’ main goal was to identify the extent to which covert actions “should be employed 
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in the future, and, if so, in what situations and under what restrictions and controls” (U.S. 
Congress. Senate 1975a, 3).  
 During the Congressional Hearings, it was reported that U.S. Government has spent about 
$14-million in total for various covert action programs in Chile (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 
10). Notably, the spending intensified after Allende’s victory in 1970 elections. During the period 
of 1970-73, the 40 Committee “authorized a total of $8.8 million for the C.I.A. covert activities 
in Chile. Of this amount, 6.5 million was spent” (U.S. Congress. Senate 1975a, 189). However, 
after the 1973 coup, most of the C.I.A. projects were terminated and the funding for covert 
actions in Chile was cut back sharply (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1975b, 40). In addition, as the 
Committee’s Staff Report indicates, C.I.A. activities after the coup were directed towards 
assisting the Junta in order to create its positive image both internally and externally, as well as 
helping them in implementing new economic policies (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1975b, 40). 
Overall, report states that the U.S. Congress “received some kind of briefing (sometimes before, 
sometimes after the fact) on projects totaling about 7.1 million dollars” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 
1975b, 50). This sum is a little more than 50% of all the spending that U.S. Government 
authorized on covert actions in Chile between 1963 and 1974. These facts show us the absence of 
C.I.A.’s consultations with U.S. Congress as well as Congress’ inadequate exercise of its 
oversight functions.  
 Based on this, the Church Committee concluded that the revelation of U.S. covert actions in 
Chile was harmful in a sense that “the United States was seen, by its covert actions, to have 
contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty commitments and principles of long 
standing” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1975b, 54). In addition, the damaged American ideals about 
“relations among nations and of constitutional government” represented more important costs as 
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a consequence of exposed covert actions (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1975b, 55).  Overall, the 
Church Committee evaluated that covert actions should be applied to “only to counter severe 
threats to the national security of the United States”, which was not the case regarding Chile as 
they have concluded (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1975b, 56). 
 Despite the huge amount of time and effort that the Church Committee put into the 
investigation, the final report was published in 1976, at the time when President Nixon had 
already resigned from the office and was replaced by his VP – Gerald Ford. In this regard, it is 
impossible to trace the effect of this investigation on the popularity of Nixon during his 
presidency. Thus, it is suggested to look at the presidential approval ratings of President Ford 
starting from the beginning of the investigations, which started on January 27, 1975. If there was 
any effect of the Congressional investigations, they should have affected Nixon’s peer 
Republican successor – Gerald Ford. This comes from the notion that “voters with low opinions 
of the incumbent president vent their anger by voting against his fellow partisans…” (Gronke, 
Koch, and Wilson 2003, 785). Therefore, I look at the presidential approval ratings of President 
Ford in order to check the presence of any exposure effect.  
 
Public opinion polls 
President Ford started his job with a 70% approval rating in August of 1974, which, as it 
was mentioned above, went down because of him pardoning President Nixon (New York Times, 
1974). By the end of the year, his approval rating went down to 42% (see Figure 2 below, 
Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). Even though the influence of the Watergate started to lessen, the 
beginning of congressional investigations in January 1975 seems to have decreased his approval 
ratings a bit. From the beginning of the investigations, with all U.S. officials’ testimonies being 
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publicized in press (New York Times, 1975a; New York Times, 1975b), President Ford’s approval 
ratings went down to 36% in March and only in April there was an increase to 43% (see Figure 
2). 
Figure 2. Presidential Job Approval Rating of Gerald Ford, 1974-1976. 
 Source: “The American Presidency Project” Website (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). 
 
However, in April of 1976, when the Church Committee’s final report was released, 
President Ford’s approval rating was up to 48% and increased to 53% by the end of his term in 
December (see Figure 2). Despite of the New York Times reporter calling U.S. involvement in 
Chile as “the Watergate of United States foreign policy” (Winn, 1976), increasing approval 
ratings show that the effect of the congressional investigations and the revelations around it could 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
08
.1
3.
19
74
09
.0
3.
19
74
09
.2
4.
19
74
10
.0
8.
19
74
10
.1
5.
19
74
11
.0
5.
19
74
11
.1
2.
19
74
12
.0
3.
19
74
01
.0
7.
19
75
01
.2
8.
19
75
02
.2
5.
19
75
03
.0
4.
19
75
03
.2
5.
19
75
04
.0
1.
19
75
04
.1
5.
19
75
05
.0
5.
19
75
05
.2
7.
19
75
06
.2
4.
19
75
07
.2
9.
19
75
08
.1
2.
19
75
09
.0
9.
19
75
10
.0
6.
19
75
10
.1
4.
19
75
10
.2
8.
19
75
11
.1
8.
19
75
12
.0
2.
19
75
12
.1
5.
19
75
12
.3
0.
19
75
01
.2
0.
19
76
01
.2
7.
19
76
03
.0
1.
19
76
03
.1
6.
19
76
04
.1
2.
19
76
05
.1
7.
19
76
06
.0
8.
19
76
12
.1
3.
19
76
Ap
pr
ov
al
 %
 
Date 
Ford's Approval Rating 
Ford pardons Nixon 
Sept. 8 1974 
↙ ←NYT exposing article Sept. 1974  
                      ↑ 
Mid-term elections 
Nov 5 1974        ↑ 
Church Committee created 
Jan 27 1975 
Church committee's final report  
Apr 1976                            ↓ 
                                  ↑ 
Presidential elections 
Nov 11 1976 
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have only temporarily, if at all, affected President Ford’s popularity. Moreover, the biggest drop 
in his popularity happened at the very beginning of his presidency when he pardoned Nixon. 
Again, the strong impact of the Watergate scandal is undeniable here. Now, let’s see if the same 
tendency holds for the presidential and mid-term elections in terms of affecting the distribution of 
the Republican Party’s seats in Congress.  
 
Election results 
 The number of seats won or lost during the elections in both the U.S. Congress and the U.S. 
Senate could be used as an indicator of the popularity of the President’s party or the President 
himself (Cover, 1986; Marra and Ostrom, 1989). The mid-term elections of 1974 could be 
described as a major loss for the Republican Party. As the results show, the Republican Party, led 
by President Ford, lost 48 seats in the House of Representatives and 5 seats in the U.S. Senate 
(Wooley and Peters, 1999-2015). However, it is worthy to note that in the 1970 mid-term 
elections, President Nixon lost only 12 seats in the U.S. House and gained 2 seats in the U.S. 
Senate (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2015). The Republican Party’s major losses could be explained 
by President Ford’s controversial pardon of his predecessor – Nixon. The reason for this is that 
the public tends to punish members of Congress during elections if they had been supportive 
towards the President’s agenda that runs counter to the public’s preferences (Gronke, Koch, and 
Wilson 2003, 806-807). In this case, the Watergate scandal caused a lot of irritation and 
controversy among the people, which is why Ford’s pardon was perceived very negatively. 
Consequently, it affected America’s voting preferences during the mid-term and presidential 
elections.  
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The effect of the Watergate scandal 
 The Presidential elections of 1976, as it would have been expected, brought the Democratic 
Party and its presidential candidate – Jimmy Carter – to power. Republicans’ loss in the midterm 
elections of 1974 left no chances for them to hope for any rehabilitation. The reputational damage 
of the Watergate scandal destroyed the foundations of public trust in both Nixon and Ford. This, 
in turn, led to the disgrace of the Republican Party.  
 Both the presidential and mid-term elections sum up the overall effect of the Watergate 
scandal. The Watergate scandal had a far more considerable effect on the popularity of Presidents 
Nixon and Ford. This was mainly due to the massive media coverage of the Watergate scandal, 
which makes it hard to underestimate its effect on public opinion. Within the period of one 
month, as a result of “an aggressive media strategy” of the Select Committee’s chief counsel – 
Samuel Dash, almost 97% of Americans had heard about the scandal, among which 67% 
believed that President Nixon was engaged in the scandal (Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities). Such a huge coverage in all the media resources played its 
decisive role in defining the mood among the public. Therefore, it is not surprising that the effect 
of U.S. involvement in Chile was lost in the shadows of the roaring Watergate scandal.  
 
Conclusions 
 After trying to evaluate the effect of exposure through all the above-identified 
dimensions, it is clear that the revelation of U.S. involvement in Chile was paralleled with the 
Watergate affair and thus had an insignificant effect on the popularity of the U.S. president. 
Though, it does not mean that the Chile case is not important or that it did not have any effect. As 
it was stated in the Church Committee’s Staff Report, the exposure of U.S. covert involvement in 
Chile discredited the image of U.S. private and governmental institutions in the international 
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community and created an image of U.S. violating its own core principles (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. 1975b, 55). One lesson that we can learn from the Chilean case is that the domestic 
scandals over controversial issues, with the direct involvement of the President, tend to outweigh 
the effect of external issues, especially when the information related to latter is unclear and 
distorted.  
To conclude, the overall assessment of U.S. covert actions in Chile shows the 
complexities of evaluating the exposure effect in terms of differentiating it from the others factors 
and events that might influence presidential popularity. In addition to that, the disclosure of both 
events was in one temporal domain, which makes it more difficult and complicated to evaluate 
the actual effect of covert action’s exposure in comparison to such a huge scandal like Watergate. 
More in-depth case studies need to be conducted in order to evaluate the exposure effect without 
the influence of any other major factors. Thus, further studies of existing covert actions’ 
exposures might benefit the field of knowledge by explaining the causal mechanisms behind the 
revelation process and its effect on a President.  
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Chapter 6  U.S. Covert Action in Nicaragua, 1980s 
 
Introduction  
 After the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, a leftist government replaced the U.S.-supported 
regime, which caused a discontent among U.S. high officials. Starting from 1981 to 1990, the 
U.S. was involved in constant attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government. This case of 
covert actions, in fact, is considered to be one of the most intensive and enduring in U.S. history 
(Leogrande 1996, 329). The Sandinista Government was targeted by the U.S. because of fears 
that socialist reforms planned by the new Nicaraguan government might cause a domino effect in 
Latin America in spreading communist ideology, which consequently would threaten security 
interests of the United States.  
This case study is intended to analyze the effect of U.S. covert actions’ exposure on 
President Reagan’s popularity by seeking to answer the following question: what effect did the 
exposure of U.S. involvement in the Iran-contra affair have on the popularity of the American 
president? The case study proceeds in the following sections: (i) background of the covert action, 
(ii) executed covert actions, (iii) and the central part of the paper examines the exposure and its 
effect on the popularity of the U.S. President. 
 
Background of a covert action 
 President Carter was suspicious about the Sandinistas and adopted a policy of “cautious 
acceptance of the new Nicaraguan government” (Leogrande 1996, 330). Despite his suspicions, 
President Carter continued to support Nicaragua with aid donations. However, these seemingly 
good relations were put at risk in January of 1981, when the Nicaraguan government was found 
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to sell arms to El Salvador. Consequently, President Carter temporarily stopped the aid flow, 
which was the first signal of a decline in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. However, Reagan was more 
firm on the matter of cutting aid and started his aggressive campaign in blocking credits, 
assistance, as well as persuading other states to follow the example of the U.S. and not help the 
Nicaraguans (Leogrande 1996, 331-333).  
 At the same time, the Reagan administration started to fund a counter-revolutionary group, 
the contras. By doing so, in the winter of 1981-82, “the Reagan Administration began its policy 
of organizing covert military attacks against Sandinista government” (Forsythe 1992, 390). The 
CIA launched covert operations like providing aid and military training to the rebels, organizing 
operations against the local infrastructure, agriculture, as well as promoting an anti-Sandinista 
propaganda campaign (Scott 1997, 243). All of this was happening despite of 1984 prohibition by 
the U.S. House of Representatives to further any funding to the contras. This is the time Reagan 
and his administration decided to look for another source of finance without making any prior 
notice to Congress.  
  
Executed covert actions  
 Reagan was desperate in providing the contras with needed weapons and funding. Thus, 
the Reagan Administration encouraged foreign countries (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa) 
to supply weapons and funding to the contras (Johnson 1989, 102; Sobel 1995, 290–291). 
Overall, the Reagan Administration had applied various types of covert actions as economic and 
highly secret military operations.  
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Economic actions:  
 The Reagan Administration tried to use all possible resources to destabilize the Sandinista 
government. In doing so, they established an economic war against Nicaragua, in which U.S. 
officials tried to block or limit any financial assistance to the country. In addition to the reduction 
of bilateral trade, the Reagan Administration vetoed low-interest loans from the Inter-American 
Development Bank as well as terminated the Export-Import bank’s guarantees “to finance 
American exports to Nicaragua” (Rubenberg 1988, 1500).  
  
Military actions: 
 Despite of the prohibition, during the years of 1983-84, the Reagan administration initiated 
various sabotage operations. Those included blowing up boats and bridges, sending helicopters to 
attack the Nicaraguan ports, as well as its coastal defenses (Leogrande 1996, 340).  
 However, the largest operation was initiated in 1985 when the Reagan administration 
decided to make the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran. It all started in March-May period of 1984 
when 14 American citizens were taken as hostages in Beirut (Weiner 2008, 396). Due to the lack 
of needed intelligence, the C.I.A. was hesitant to launch any rescue operations. They were 
looking for possible alternatives when one of the C.I.A.’s assets in Paris, Manucher Ghorbanifer, 
proposed a plan, according to which “the United States could ship missiles to Iran, using a 
trading firm called Star Line, which Ghorbanifer ran in tandem with the Israeli intelligence 
service” (Weiner 2008, 397). As Ghorbanifer argued, this should have persuaded Tehran to help 
to release the hostages in exchange for provided arms.  
 At the same time, the C.I.A. director – William Casey – was struggling to find a source of 
funding for the agency’s Central American activities. That said, in January 1985, Casey had come 
up with a great plan of combining these two issues – hostages and contra’s funding – and decided 
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to initiate a “grand bargain with Iran” (Weiner 2008, 399). Casey explained his plan to Reagan 
and on August 3 of 1985, Mr. President approved the deal. The logic was straightforward, the 
U.S., with the help of Israel and Ghorbanifar, would ship the missiles to Iran, which had an 
influence over Hezbollah who held the American hostages so they would be released after the 
deal is settled.   
 The Iranian side agreed to help rescue U.S. hostages in Lebanon in exchange for arms from 
the U.S. side. However, this deal violated not only the restrictions of the Boland amendments but 
also the “two pillars of Reagan’s foreign policy – no deals with terrorists, no arms for Iran” 
(Weiner 2008, 402). In addition, it violated the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism 
Act, which prohibits the provision of any item in the U.S. Munitions List to countries that the 
Secretary of State determined as being supportive of international terrorism (Scheffer 1987, 699).  
However, the Reagan Administration was so desperate to obtain the release of the hostages and to 
find the sources to finance the contras that they initiated the deal. The profits made out of this 
sale went directly to sponsor the contras in Nicaragua. 
 
Exposure and the popularity of the President 
 The revelation of U.S. covert involvement started in October of 1986 when a Nicaraguan 
soldier shot down an American plane, which was carrying arms to the contras. Then on 3 
November 1986, a Lebanese magazine reported about Reagan’s National Security Advisor, 
Robert C. McFarlane’s, visit to Tehran and all shortly after the visit the U.S. supplied arms to 
Iran (Krosnick and Kinder 1990, 498). This, in turn, caused a resonance in the mass media, which 
eventually led to President Reagan making a public statement on 13 November 1986. In his 
statement, he admitted the fact that there, indeed, was a “diplomatic initiative” with the Iranian 
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side, however, Reagan denied the plausibility of the arms-for-hostages story (New York Times 
1986). 
 
Media coverage 
 Despite the president’s statement, on 25 November 1986 Attorney General Meese 
“announced to a national television audience that funds obtained from the secret sale of weapons 
to Iran had been channeled to the contras fighting to overthrow the Sandinista government in 
Nicaragua” (Krosnick and Kinder 1990, 498).  
 After the revelation of news about U.S. covert arms deal with Iran and supporting the 
contras, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Congress would investigate whether “whether 
the Reagan Administration had used the White House staff to circumvent Congressional 
restrictions on foreign policy and covert operations” (Engelberg 1986). Few weeks later, the New 
York Times reported President Reagan’s statement that he was unaware of his Administration’s 
policy towards Iran and that the “$30 million intended to pay for American arms had been 
secretly diverted to rebel forces in Nicaragua” (Weinraub 1986).  
 Moreover, Reagan announced the resignation of two members of his office who he held 
responsible for the Iran-contra affair – Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter and Lieut. Col. Oliver L. 
North (Weinraub 1986). All of this news had its negative effect on President Reagan’s popularity, 
which could be seen from the decline in presidential approval to 47% in the beginning of 
December, compared to the 64% in November 1986 (see Figure 3 below). Similar results were 
obtained from the New York Times/CBS polls, which indicated that “47 percent said they thought 
Mr. Reagan was “lying” when he said he did not know that money from the Iranian arms sales 
was going to help the Nicaraguan insurgents…” (Boyd 1986).  
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Figure 3. Presidential Job Approval Rating of Ronald Reagan in 1986. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “The American Presidency Project” Website (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). 
 
Despite the Congressional investigations started to hear from November and December of 1986 
(Fuerbringer 1986), and numerous New York Times reports being publicized throughout 1987 
(Engelberg 1987; New York Times 1987), the approval rating of President Reagan increased 
slightly over the course of one year (see Figure 4).  However, on the average, during the year of 
1987 it maintained on 49% approval rating. For now, let us see if this tendency would be 
consistent within the other dimensions.   
 
Congressional Investigations 
The Iran-contra affair could be evaluated as one of the biggest constitutional confrontations 
between Congress and the White House (Timbers 1990, 31). The reason for a congressional 
investigation was the illegal nature of covert actions in shipping the arms to Iran, as well as  
 
U.S. arms sale to Iran   
exposed, Nov 25 1986 
               ↓ 
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funding the contras in Nicaragua, which occurred despite the Boland amendments that prohibited 
any aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. Moreover, contrary to the rulings of the National Security and 
Intelligence Oversight Acts, the Congress had never been notified about the arms and other 
covert operational initiatives (Hicks 1996, 971).  
 
 Figure 4. Presidential Job Approval Rating of Ronald Reagan, 1981-1986. 
 
Source: “The American Presidency Project” Website (Wooley and Peters, 1999-2016). 
  
 
 Thus, three separate committees were established in order to investigate the issue 
(Rubenberg 1988, 1477). The first investigative body, commenced on December 1 1986, was the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which, as it is stated in its report, failed to reach any 
plausible conclusions or findings, because of “its preliminary nature” and only might be helpful 
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“to note discrepancies and gaps” of the information that the Committee have gathered (U.S. 
Congress. Senate 1987, 1).  In addition, the report also mentioned how it could be used “to save 
time by moving more rapidly through the preliminary stages of its investigation” (U.S. Congress. 
Senate 1987, 1).  
 The second, Tower Commission, was a special board appointed by President Reagan on 
November 25 1986, which focused on the examination of national security processes and 
procedures (Rubenberg 1988, 1478). Overall, the Tower Commission concluded that the whole 
NSC system was functioning on a decent level and that it was the fault of the people, not the 
structure itself, which led to the notorious Iran-contra affair. In this way, the Commission tried to 
protect the President from any negative fallout around the issue at stake. This, in turn, led to the 
final investigation of the House-Senate Committee. 
 The hearings of the House and Senate select committees started on May 5, 1987. 
Congressional committee members interrogated U.S. officials who were supposedly engaged in 
covert activities. Among many there was the President’s National Security Adviser Admiral 
Poindexter and National Security Council staff member lieutenant colonel Oliver North. Later on, 
these officials would be admitted as the main responsibility bearers of the Iran-contra affair. In 
their testimonies, both North and Poindexter did not hesitate to challenge the constitutional power 
of Congress to participate in foreign policy making (Fisher 1988, 156). Moreover, Poindexter 
testified that he had not told the President about the diversion in order to grant him political 
deniability (Greenhouse 1987). Thus, there was no other strong evidence that Reagan or Bush 
was related to the Iran-contra affair in order to hold them accountable for the issue.  
The fact that the House-Senate investigation concentrated its attention on general issues of 
“who did what, when, and who knew about it” and their incompetence to analyze broader issues 
like deficiencies in a national security system or Presidential accountability shows us their 
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negligence in revealing and punishing the real culprits behind the Iran-contra affair. The 
consequences of congressional investigations were that the Congress decided to tighten its 
control over the covert actions’ usage by setting up a 48-hour limit for the President to inform the 
Congress (Hicks 1996, 972). As well as, it convicted a dozen officials, among which were “three 
CIA officers, five ‘privateers’, and four administration officials” (Nichols 1992, 28). However, 
both North and Poindexter’s convictions were invalidated in 1991 based on the reasoning that 
“their previous congressional testimony may have prejudiced their cause” (Nichols 1992, 28).  
 
Public opinion polls 
Overall, it is safe to conclude that the Congressional hearings did not have a significant 
effect on President Reagan’s popularity. This can be seen in Figure 4 where there is a positive 
trend of increasing approval, which went up to 61% in December 1987, from a 40% indicator at 
the end of February 1987 when the first report of the Intelligence Committee was issued. The 
only significant decline in presidential approval was at the very beginning of the Iran-contra 
affair’s exposure in the period between November and December 1986.  
The main reasons why Reagan’s rates did not decrease after the congressional 
investigations are the following: the confusing nature of the hearings, absence of any direct 
accusations towards President Reagan, the unwillingness of the Congress to initiate “another 
Watergate”, as well as factors like the President’s senior age and upcoming end of his term 
(Hersh 1990). Since there was no change in presidential approval ratings, it makes sense to look 
at the election results to see whether there was an effect or not.  
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Election results 
 In order to evaluate the effect of the Iran-contra affair, I look at the results of both 
presidential and mid-term elections during President Reagan’s tenure. Specifically, I look at the 
number of seats that have been won or lost as a result of elections in both the U.S. House and 
U.S. Senate. The mid-term elections of November 4 1986, which took place right after the 
exposure of the Iran-contra arms initiative, show a minor loss in seats for President Reagan. The 
Republican Party lost only 5 seats in the House and 8 seats in the Senate (Wooley and Peters 
1999-2015).  
 The presidential elections of 1988, which were held on November 8, resulted in a victory of 
George Bush’s for presidential candidacy.  The Republican Party, led by Bush, lost only two 
seats in the House and did not gain or lose any seats in the Senate (Wooley and Peters 1999-
2013). As the New York Times reported, Bush defeated his opponent Mr. Dukakis by 54% to 46% 
in the popular vote (Dionne 1988). The main reasons for Bush to win the office, as a report says, 
were these two: “his role as Mr. Reagan’s heir at a time of the President’s resurgent popularity 
and a general contentment with the state of nation’s economy” (Dionne 1988). However, 46% of 
the votes earned by Dukakis and 262 seats won by Democrats in the House as opposed to 173 of 
Republicans show us that the 1988 Presidential race was not an easy victory for Bush or 
Republicans by any means (Dionne 1988).  
 Overall, the fact that another Republican candidate managed it to win the presidential office 
shows us the temporary effect that the exposure of the Iran-contra affair had on the popularity of 
President Reagan, which seems as not to have an influence on his Vice-President Bush.  
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Conclusions 
The case of Nicaragua give us an illustration of how the President might use covert actions 
as a foreign policy tool in pursuing what he thinks to be right and plausible. The scale of the 
whole Iran-contra operation is shocking in its enormity. It involved not only the initiator and 
target sides, but unraveled the participation of foreign actors and private sponsors, who were 
involved by the Reagan’s administration in order to fulfill their plan of overthrowing the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In addition, the fact that the Reagan Administration had 
made a deal with Iran, one of the most hated U.S. enemies back in the day, in order to rescue the 
hostages held by a terrorist organization made the Iran-contra affair to cause a lot of resonance in 
the media. Overall, the most surprising fact in the case of Nicaragua is that President Reagan 
managed to escape from the punishment due to the scrupulous efforts in minimizing the effect of 
exposure, by creating the confusion around the hearings, as well as in finding the ones who 
would take the whole responsibility. To conclude, there was no long lasting effect of the Iran-
contra affair’s exposure on President Reagan’s popularity. The effect was mainly temporary 
during the first months of exposure. As a result, President Reagan’s heir – George Bush – as well 
as his Republican Party won the 1988 elections despite a serious competition from the 
Democratic side. This, in turn, shows us how the effect of exposure might differ depending on 
the level of complexity and sophistication created around the covert action and its investigation.   
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Further Implications 
 
 In following their primary goal – staying in the office – U.S. Presidents apply various 
policies both overtly and covertly. Each of them has beneficial as well as costly components in 
using them. The extent to which unsuccessful overt policy decisions influence the U.S. 
President’s popularity has been well studied and examined. However, the existing scholarship 
seem to be silent about the effects that failed covert policy decisions might have on U.S. 
President’s approval rating. This project was motivated by an intention to take an attempt and 
address this puzzling notion.  
 To do so, I have constructed my theoretical framework where I have assumed that the 
exposed use of covert actions should negatively affect a U.S. President and, moreover, that this 
effect would be greater if the covert action’s target state was a democracy. In order to test these 
assumptions I have analyzed 16 cases of U.S. covert actions, among which 13 were exposed 
during the initiator President’s term. Among those 13 cases, eight of them were followed by a 
decrease in presidential approval ratings, which supported my first hypothesis that the exposed 
covert actions should have a negative effect on a U.S. President. Hence, I further found out that 
three of these eight cases were democratic countries and that the revelation of covert actions 
against them was also followed by a decrease in Presidential popularity. This, in turn, supported 
my second hypothesis. However, the results for non-democratic target states were split in a half. 
Among 10 cases of exposure for non-democratic states, five of them had an effect and five had 
not have any effect on presidential popularity. This, in turn, might be an interesting research 
avenue for further studies to look at what is the difference between these cases to cause 
contrasting results. Overall, after obtaining these preliminary results, I decided to conduct a case 
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of one democratic (Chile) and one non-democratic (Nicaragua) state and see if there was any 
difference in the exposure effect.  
 Although my preliminary case classification results looked supportive to my hypotheses, 
the in-depth case studies told a more nuanced story. The interesting fact is that both covert 
actions’ exposure were followed by a drop in presidential approval ratings; however, it only had a 
temporary effect. In both cases, numerous factors affected the degree to which a covert action’s 
disclosure had affected a U.S. President’s popularity. In the case of Chile, most of the public 
attention was overwhelmingly dominated by the Watergate scandal. Regarding the case of 
Nicaragua, even though there were direct indicators of public discontent, the effect of disclosing 
the Iran-contra affair vanished throughout the time. This could be explained by the ambiguity 
and frustration that surrounded the congressional investigations and U.S. officials’ testimonies. 
Consequently, neither of U.S. Presidents suffered a long lasting effect of both covert actions’ 
exposure.  
 After conducting my qualitative analyses, I conclude that the exposure effect varies from 
case to case depending on various factors. This project illustrated the importance of factors like 
media coverage, the complexity of congressional investigations, and the presence of any major 
domestic issues/scandals in defining the exposure effect of covert actions. In addition, my case 
studies showed that the regime type of the target seem to matter. As Senator Church emphasized 
it, “the nature and extent of the American role in the overthrow of a democratically-elected 
Chilean Government are matters for deep and continuing public concern” (U.S. Congress. Senate 
1975a, 1). In its turn, the Nicaraguan case was prominent in a sense that it involved a deal with 
Iran, which was considered one of the biggest U.S. adversaries at a time.  In addition, the above-
mentioned factors like media coverage, the complexity of congressional investigations, and the 
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presence of any major domestic issues/scandals also has its role in shaping the domestic public’s 
evaluation of covert actions, as well as the overall strength of the exposure.  
 Overall, I suggest that more rigorous studies of the U.S. covert actions would help to 
evaluate its exposure effect on the presidential popularity. In this sense, further in-depth case 
studies and data collection need to be done in order to identify the full range of factors that affect 
the exposure effect and its potential influence on a U.S. President.  
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Appendix 1 The List of U.S. Covert Actions during the Cold War Period, 
1949-1989  
Source: Berger et al (2013). 
 
1. Afghanistan 1979-89  
2. Angola 1976 
3. Brazil 1964  
4. Chile 1970-73  
5. Cuba 1959  
6. Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960-65  
7. Dominican Republic 1961  
8. Guatemala 1954  
9. Indonesia 1958  
10. Iran 1953  
11. Iraq 1960-63  
12. Nicaragua 1981-90  
13. Poland 1980-89  
14. South Vietnam 1963  
15. Syria 1949  
16. Turkey 1980  
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